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CRIMINAL LAW AND PROCEDURE
OVERVIEW
This section of the Tenth Circuit Survey is a compilation of
the major cases decided last term in the area of criminal law and
procedure. This is only a sampling of all Tenth Circuit criminal
cases, and the treatment given to them is intended only as an
overview, not as an exhaustive analysis.
The Tenth Circuit decisions in this area were for the most
part straightforward applications of established precedent. None
of the cases presents any significant development or change, al-
though the factual situations are sometimes thought-provoking
and rather extreme.
The section is divided into seven categories: Fourth Amend-
ment; Fifth Amendment; Sixth Amendment; Trial Matters; Jury
Instructions; Post-trial Proceedings, and Statutory Interpreta-
tion.
I. FOURTH AMENDMENT: SEARCH AND SEIZURE
A. Consent
In United States v. Abbott,' the Tenth Circuit ruled that a
wife's participation in a search of her husband's automobile in
conjunction with police officers did not amount to specific con-
sent to a second search conducted by the same officers at a later
time in her absence. Additionally, the court sounded a note of
caution as to the validity of a citizen's consent to a warrantless
search which is obtained while the individual consenting is
clearly within the "shadow of authoritative control."'
Appellant John Abbott was in custody when his wife at-
tempted to obtain the release of his automobile from police au-
thorities.' She was informed that such a release was not possible
without presentation of the automobile's registration certificate.
A search of the passenger compartment by Mrs. Abbott with the
I 546 F.2d 883 (10th Cir. 1977).
Id. at 885.
Appellant had been stopped by the Oklahoma Highway Patrol for a routine registra-
tion check. The serial number and description on the registration produced by the appel-
lant did not correspond to the automobile he was driving. Additionally, officers discovered
a .45 caliber automatic under the seat of the automobile. Thereafter, appellant was ar-
rested for possession of the weapon and illegal registration of the automobile. Id. at 884.
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assistance of a police officer proved unsuccessful in locating the
registration. Mrs. Abbott then suggested that the title might be
in a box locked in the trunk of the automobile. Not possessing the
trunk keys, she departed saying she would attempt to locate the
key and return.
Subsequently, police officers obtained the trunk key from
appellant's coat pocket in his jail cell, opened the trunk, found
several registration titles and a .30 caliber carbine which was the
subject of appellant's prosecution. The government justified its
warrantless search of the trunk solely upon the claim that Mrs.
Abbott had given consent to the search.4 Appellant's motion to
suppress was denied, and he was tried, convicted, and sentenced
to imprisonment.
Upon appeal, the Tenth Circuit reversed the conviction with
instructions to sustain appellant's motion to suppress.' The rever-
sal was justified on two grounds. First, the court stated that there
was no evidence that Mrs. Abbott ever expressly consented to a
search of the trunk. At most, she had only implicitly consented
to a search in her presence and with her assistance.
Second, the court warned that even if actual consent had
been obtained, the burden would be heavy upon the state to show
that it had been made freely and voluntarily and was not a prod-
uct of the authoritative atmosphere in which she had been
placed.' The court emphasized that the atmosphere in which con-
' The court pointed out that the prosecution made no claim that the subject warrant-
less search was justified by any exigency of time or circumstances nor was it excused
within the bounds of Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42 (1970) (warrantless search of
automobile at police station held proper where same search at place of arrest would have
been impractical) or South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364 (1976) (inventory search
following standard police procedures not a violation of the fourth amendment's prohibi-
tion of unreasonable search and seizures). 546 F.2d at 884.
5 The government must meet a three-part test to justify a warrantless search based
upon consent. The requirements were paraphrased as set out below:
(1) There must be clear and positive testimony that consent was
"unequivocal and specific" and "freely and intelligently" given; (2) the gov-
ernment must prove consent was given without duress or coercion, express
or implied; and (3) the courts indulge every reasonable presumption against
the waiver of fundamental constitutional rights and there must be convinc-
ing evidence that such rights were waived.
Id. at 885 (paraphrasing the test enunciated in Villano v. United States, 310 F.2d 680,
684 (10th Cir. 1962).
1 Factors given as creating the authoritative atmosphere were the incarceration of
Mrs. Abbott's husband, the impoundment of the auto, the number of police officers in
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sent is given will always be a factor when the court is considering
whether or not one has waived a fundamental right.7
In United States v. Sor-Lokken,8 a "quitclaim" 9 deed to re-
tain real and personal property was ruled to be a sufficient prop-
erty interest to allow a third party to consent to a warrantless
search. The court ruled that such an instrument, regardless of the
exact nature of the property interest conveyed, bestowed upon
the grantee the right to enjoy access to the residence and its
contents, thus meeting the test of common authority set forth in
United States v. Matlock.'0
The deed was issued to a neighbor, Rhodes, by Sor-Lokken
while he was in the process of spiriting his children away from
visitation by his former wife. Mrs. Lokken, in an effort to locate
her children and former husband, informed police officials of the
location of several unregistered firearms within the abandoned
house of her former husband. As a result of this information,
police officers made two separate warrantless searches of the Sor-
Lokken home. The validity of the second search, made pursuant
to the neighbor's consent, became the issue on appeal."
The defendant challenged the authority of Rhodes to consent
to such police activity."2 The court found that the neighbor's con-
the area, and the unlikelihood of Mrs. Abbot believing she could search the car in privacy.
546 F.2d at 885.
7Id.
557 F.2d 755 (10th Cir. 1977).
Defendant requested that his neighbor and personal friend take care of his property
while he was in absence. The neighbor, Mr. Rhodes, was given a key to the house and a
handwritten notarized note reading: "I Scott Sor-Lokken do hereby Quit Claim all my
household goods, cars, real and personal property to Dan Rhodes of Liberty, Utah. They
are his items as of this writing to disperse, keep as he desires 710 (1910 hours) 14 October
1975. Scott Sor-Lokken." Id. at 756.
70 415 U.S. 164 (1974). Mattlock allowed a third party to consent to a warrantless
search if he possessed either "common authority" over the inspected premises or property
or some other "sufficient relationship to the premises or effects sought to be inspected."
Id. at 171.
The court also analogized the situation presented in Sor-Lokken to two other consent
search cases. In Frazier v. Cupp, 394 U.S. 731 (1969), the defendant shared the use of his
duffle bag with another and was said to have "assumed the risk" that his companion
"would allow someone else to look inside." Id. at 740; and United States v. Eldridge, 302
F.2d 463 (4th Cir. 1962). A gratuitous bailee in possession of a borrowed car was held
capable of giving consent, binding against the owner, to have the trunk searched. Id.
" The first search, made solely at the request of the former wife, had been found
clearly illegal by the trial court. Id. at 756-57.
" A second issue addressed by the court was whether the first search made without
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sent was voluntarily made prior to the officer's search and that
he had sufficient authority over the property as a result of the
"quitclaim deed" to give consent to the search. Thus, the search
and subsequent seizure of the unregistered firearms were held
valid under the fourth amendment.'3
B. Validity of Search Warrant
In United States v. Millar,4 the Tenth Circuit ruled that in
a state search with minimal or no federal involvement, a search
warrant need only conform to federal constitutional requirements
to render evidence seized admissible in federal prosecutions. The
defendant had argued that the state officials' failure to have the
search warrant issued by a magistrate of a court of record as was
required by the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure 5 was a fatal
defect to the use of the evidence discovered against him in a
federal action."
The court, however, ruled that the search was purely a state
search with no federal implications. Millar was stopped by a state
highway patrolman for a routine registration check. The odor of
marijuana and the presence of several marijuana seeds on the
floorboard resulted in the local police magistrate issuing a war-
consent from Rhodes so irreparably tainted the second search as to make the evidence thus
procured inadmissible. This issue was resolved in favor of the government on the basis of
the independent source doctrine as outlined in Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States,
251 U.S. 385 (1920). However, the court went beyond this ruling to point out that "[elven
if it were demonstrated that the officers' afternoon search was a necessary prerequisite to
the evening search, the carbine would still be unsusceptible to exclusion. . .[Clonsent
to search satisfies Fourth Amendment requirements apart from the presence or absence
of probable cause to conduct a search. The consent obtained in this case purged the
disputed search of any possible taint." 557 F.2d at 758 (citations omitted).
' Id. at 757-58.
3, 543 F.2d 1280 (10th Cir. 1976).
FED . R. CiuM. P. 41(a). Authority to Issue Warrant. A search warrant authorized
by this rule may be issued by a federal magistrate of a judge of a state court of record
within the district wherein the property sought is located, upon request of a federal law
enforcement officer or an attorney for the government (emphasis added).
"1 Millar was charged with the possession of marijuana with an intent to distribute,
in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) (1970). 543 F.2d at 1282.
In his motion to suppress the defendant raised three arguments: (1) The initial stop-
ping of his vehicle was arbitrary and merely a pretext for a general search; (2) the affidavit
presented to the New Mexico magistrate was insufficient; and (3) the warrant was issued
by a magistrate for the State of New Mexico, who was not a judge of a court of record,
and hence there was noncompliance with Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure 41(a). Id.
The court dismissed the first two contentions and only the third argument will be dis-
cussed in this overview.
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rant. The warrant was executed by a state patrolman. No federal
official played any role either in the obtaining of the search war-
rant or in the search that followed. 7 The search itself did not
violate any fourth amendment constitutional requirements.
Under these circumstances, the Court of Appeals stressed that
the mere fact that the court issuing the warrant was not a court
of record did not render the evidence obtained in the search inad-
missible."
While admitting that the element of time is crucial to proba-
ble cause and the issuance of a search warrant, the Tenth Circuit
in United States v. Brinklow" nevertheless upheld the validity of
a search warrant based upon an observation made eleven months
previously. 20 Defendant was charged with four federal violations, 21
all of which arose out of his alleged bombing of a Port of Entry
building in Colorado Springs. Authorities, acting on information
received from Brinklow's accomplice in the bombing, executed a
search warrant upon defendant's mobile home. Seized in the
search were a citizens band radio (used to detonate the bombing
device electronically), a police radio scanner (used to avoid police
detection), and a notebook delineating dates and mileage figures
of trips taken in the mobile home.
" The court pointed out that the complete state nature of the search distinguished
it from the situation presented to the Fifth Circuit in Navarro v. United States, 400 F.2d
315 (1968). In Navarro, the search in question was deemed to be a federal search because
federal agents had participated in the search and thus the requirements of Federal Rules
of Criminal Procedure 41(a) were deemed applicable. 543 F.2d at 1284.
" The court was careful to point out that its holding in Millar did not "do violence"
to the rule set forth by the Supreme Court in Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206 (1960).
Elkins held that evidence obtained in a purely state search, which if conducted by federal
officers would have violated the defendant's fourth amendment rights, is inadmissible
over defendant's timely objections in a subsequent federal criminal proceeding. Id. at 223.
In Millar there was no violation of the defendant's constitutional fourth amendment
rights; it was merely an issue of compliance with federal procedural rules in a purely state
search. 543 F.2d at 1284.
" 560 F.2d 1003 (10th Cir. 1977).
In so doing, the Tenth Circuit expanded the holding of their 1972 decision in United
States v. Johnson, 461 F.2d 285 (10th Cir. 1972). In Johnson the court held that the
element of time must be examined in conjunction with the nature of the unlawful activity,
and, where the affidavit recites a more isolated event, the existence of probable cause
dwindles with the passage of time; however, where the affidavit recites facts indicating
activity of a protracted and continuous nature, the passage of time becomes less signifi-
cant. Id. at 287.
11 Brinklow was indicted on four separate counts including: (1) interstate transporta-
tion of explosives; (2) destruction of a building used in interstate commerce; (3) transpor-
tation of stolen explosive material; and (4) illegal possession of a firearm. 560 F.2d at 1004.
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Significant in the holding was the fact that the objects
sought in the search were of the type "which could reasonably be
expected to be kept... for extended periods of time."22 The court
emphasized that:
[pirobable cause is not determined by merely counting the number
of days between the time of the facts relied upon and the warrant's
issuance. The significance of the length of time between the point
probable cause arose and when the warrant issued depends largely
upon the property's nature, and should be contemplated in view of
the practical considerations of every day life. The test is one of
common sense.2
Thus, due to the semipermanent nature of the property being
sought, the court in Brinklow held that eleven months was not so
long a period of time as to evaporate the probable cause inherent
in the coconspirator's tardy revelation.
II. FFi AMENDMENT
A. Double Jeopardy
In Goode v. McCune4 the Tenth Circuit in dictums dis-
missed any suggestion that the double jeopardy clause barred
state and federal convictions arising out of the same act. The
court addressed this issue in an appeal of a denial of habeas
corpus where the defendant sought to credit part of a Texas bank
robbery sentence to a subsequent federal term.
The Tenth Circuit set out two reasons why the double jeop-
ardy clause did not bar parallel state and federal trials. First, the
federal bank robbery charge differed in proof from the state
charge; the federal charge required a showing that the bank had
22 Id. at 1006. All of the items seized from the vehicle had been seen there within the
last year; all were designed for long term use; none were inculpatory per se; nor were any
of them of the type which were likely to be disposed of for any other readily apparent
reason.
23 Id. at 1005-06 (citations omitted). Among the cases cited as authority for the test
utilized were United States v. Rahn, 511 F.2d 290 (10th Cir. 1975), and United States v.
Johnson, 461 F.2d 285 (10th Cir. 1972). In Rahn the Tenth Circuit upheld a search warrant
based upon observations of alleged unlawful activity made more than a year and a half
before the application for a search warrant.
- 543 F.2d 751 (10th Cir. 1976).
Id. at 752. The court apparently was not obliged to address the issue. This conclu-
sion is supported by the court's pronouncement that the only issue of the case was
"whether Goode [was] entitled to credit on his federal sentence for the period of time he
remained in state custody."
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some federal connection." Second, there were two separate sover-
eignties, Texas and the federal government, each having a right
to exact a penalty for violation of its laws.Y Thus, the double
jeopardy clause did not protect the defendant because he was
tried by separate sovereignties on different charges.
Using this dual-sovereignty rationale, the court denied the
defendant any entitlement to credit three years of his Texas sent-
ence to his subsequent federal term.28 The court reasoned that the
defendant owed each sovereignty a debt, and since the Texas
sentence was attributable only to the state charges, the federal
government was not obliged to credit the state sentence.29
Although the Tenth Circuit's rationale in Goode is in con-
formity with the majority view, 0 it is not without criticism. In
double jeopardy issues, the dual-sovereignty approach is particu-
larly suspect when the gravamen of the state charge is compara-
ble to the federal charge.3" This criticism assumes that state and
federal interests in justice are sufficiently parallel, vitiating any
need to exact separate penalties for the same act.32
In United States v. Gunter 3 the Tenth Circuit held that the
double jeopardy clause was inapplicable where the defendants
were tried a third time after the juries in the first two trials were
0 The federal connection was proved by showing that the bank was insured by the
FDIC. Id. at 753.
v Id.
" There was conflict in the affidavits as to whether Texas had credited Goode's state
confinement from the period after his arrest to his conviction a year later. Id.
"Id.
See United States v. Abbate, 359 U.S. 187 (1959); Bartkus v. Illinois, 359 U.S. 121
(1959).
" If the state and federal statutes are similar in purpose, then the double jeopardy
clause could be construed to cut off a subsequent trial for the same act by a different
sovereignty. Contra, Bartkus v. Illinois, 359 U.S. 121, 138 (1959) (the Court stated that it
was a problem that could be resolved by state statute).
"2 Compare Walker v. Florida 389 U.S. 387 (1970) (state and local prosecutions barred
by the double jeopardy clause); Bartkus v. Illinois, 359 U.S. 121, 150 (1959) (Black, J.,
dissenting) (state and federal interests are sufficiently akin to bar parallel trials). See
generally Fisher, Double Jeopardy, Two Sovereignties, and the Intruding Constitution, 28
U. CHI. L. REv. 591 (1961); Pontikes, Dual Sovereignty and Double Jeopardy, 14 W. Ras.
L. REv. 700 (1963).
Normally, the federal government has not sought to prosecute where a state has
prosecuted for substantially the same offense. In two cases this policy has resulted in
dismissal of federal charges. See Petite v. United States, 361 U.S. 529 (1960); Orlando v.
United States, 387 F.2d 348 (9th Cir. 1967).
546 F.2d 861 (10th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 920 (1977).
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unable to reach verdicts. 4 Nine defendants were charged with the
theft of an interstate shipment of auto tires. 5 At the conclusion
of the third trial eight of the defendants had been convicted. Four
appealed, raising the defense of double jeopardy.36
The Tenth Circuit found clear authority supporting the first
retrial. Relying on United States v. Perez37 and its progeny,38 the
court upheld the discretionary power of the trial judge to dis-
charge the jury and permit a retrial because the circumstances
were such that there was "a manifest necessity for the act
[retrial] or the ends of public justice would otherwise be de-
feated. '39 Retrials in deadlocked jury situations have been
equated with "manifest necessity" and "the ends of public jus-
tice" because of the vital interest in reaching final judgments.'"
In considering whether a third trial fell within the purview
of Perez, the court concluded that there were recognizable situa-
tions where the double jeopardy clause would create a bar." How-
ever, the facts of this case still militated toward a retrial. Of
particular significance to the court was the trial judge's proper
exercise of discretion in granting the two mistrials."
The court distinguished this case from two other circuit deci-
sions where a third trial and a fourth trial were overturned be-
cause the trial judges had abused their discretion in granting the
" The court also addressed the issues of third party consent to an otherwise unlawful
search and seizure, amendments to an indictment, and other ancillary issues. Id. at 867-
69.
Id. at 864. Presumably much of the difficulty the juries had in arriving at a verdict
resulted from the large number of defendants and the complex facts surrounding the theft.
11 The Tenth Circuit ruled that the double jeopardy issue was appealable after the
third trial because it represented the type of plain error which could be raised anew under
FED. R. CPiM. P. 52(b). Id. at 864-65.
3' 22 U.S. 579 (1824).
3 See Illinois v. Somerville, 410 U.S. 458 (1973); Downun v. United States, 372 U.S.
734 (1963); wade v. Hunter, 336 U.S. 684 (1949).
11 546 F.2d at 861, 866. The judge could have discharged the deadlocked jury and
made a judgment of acquittal under FED. R. CaIM. P. 29(b) if he had found that the
government's evidence was insufficient to support a conviction. See United States v.
Martin Linen Supply Co., 430 U.S. 564 (1977).
,0 Illinois v. Somerville, 410 U.S. 548, 470-71 (1973).
" The court wrote that "[tihere may indeed be a breaking point, but we do not
believe it was reached in the instant case." 546 F.2d at 866.
42 In Gunter the Tenth Circuit did not find an abuse of discretion in the declaration
of a mistrail after the second trial, even though the jury had deliberated only four and
one half hours. Id. at 865.
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mistrials." The court also seemed to embrace a view that as the
number of retrials increased, manifest necessity and the ends of
public justice might weigh less heavily in favor of another at-
tempt to reach a final verdict."
In United States v. Appawool5 the Tenth Circuit faced a
procedural dilemma wherein it was obliged to hear appeals of two
judgments of acquittal despite a possible double jeopardy bar. At
the trial court level, District Judge Ritter refused to rule on
pretrial motions to dismiss the informations." The judge's refusal
to rule was in contravention of FED. R. CRIM. P. 12(b)(2).' 7 How-
ever, once the juries had been impaneled, thereby initiating jeop-
ardy, 8 and the prosecution had presented its cases,"9 the judge
ruled on the motions and thereafter granted judgments of acquit-
tal under FED. R. CRIM. P. 29(a).10
The judge's avowed purpose in delaying his rulings on the
motions was to.prevent appeals of pretrial motions5' which nor-
" In Webb v. Court of Common Pleas, 516 F.2d 1034, 1040-41 (3d Cir. 1975), the court
described the range of discretion in granting a mistrial as severely limited by recent
holdings of the Supreme Court, reflecting the weight to be given to the double jeopardy
clause. In Carsey v. United States, 392 F.2d 810 (D.C. Cir. 1967), the trial judge surpassed
his discretionary bounds by arbitrarily granting a mistrial because of improper comments
by the defense counsel.
" Id. at 866. The court wrote: "The rationale of Perez suggests to us the propriety of
a third trial where the prior juries were unable to agree upon a verdict. This assumes, of
course, that the concept of manifest 'necessity' and 'ends of public justice' referred to in
Perez are met." See also Preston Blackledge, 332 F. Supp. 681 (E.D.N.C. 1971).
0 553 F.2d 1242 (10th Cir. 1977). This case was consolidated with United States v.
Casey, 553 F.2d 1242 (10th Cir. 1977).
4' The defendants raised the constitutionality of 18 U.S.C. § 1153, which concerned
assaults as defined by state law in Indian Country. The defendants claimed that if they
were not Indians they would have faced less stringent federal charges under 18 U.S.C. §
113, which provides a lesser penalty and is harder to prove than assault as defined under
Utah law. Id. at 1243.
' This rule provides that defenses based on defects in the information "may be raised
only by motion before trial."
" See Illinois v. Somerville, 410 U.S. 458 (1973).
" In Appawoo the government had rested. 553 F.2d at 1244. In Casey the prosecution
had presented just one witness. Id. at 1245.
Id. at 1244-46.
" At the conclusion of the trial in Casey, an attorney for the defendants in Appawoo
(Appawoo was tried later) moved for a dismissal on the same grounds upon which the
judge had just ruled in Casey. The judge responded:
You are not representing your client very good. You are overlooking some-
thing a practical man ought to think about. The defendant in the preceding
case was in jeopardy. . . . Now you are pushing your luck here. If I rule on
this motion before you confront a jury and that constitutional question is
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mally are appealable under 18 U.S.C. § 3731. The delays initiated
jeopardy, thus creating a double jeopardy bar to subsequent ap-
peals. The Tenth Circuit declared that the trial court's judgments
of acquittal under 29(a) were not actually acquittals within that
rule because hey were based on the constitutional issue in the
pretrial motions; 2 rule 29 requires that acquittals be based only
on the sufficiency of the evidence at trial. The court, citing
United States v. Martin Linen Supply Co., 3 determined that the
trial judge had made no resolution as to the sufficiency of the
evidence produced by the prosecution. Thus, the double jeopardy
clause was not a bar to the appeal because the trial court's
"judgments of acquittal" amounted to no more than rulings on
the constitutional issue in the pretrial motions.54
In United States v. Fay,55 the Tenth Circuit barred an appeal
because the acquittal was in fact based on the evidence. The
double jeopardy clause prevented appellate review because there
was nothing to indicate that the trial was not bona fide. 8 At the
trial court level, Judge Ritter refused to rule on a pretrial motion
to suppress evidence. 57 However, after the prosecution began its
presentation, the judge ruled on the motion, suppressing evidence
vital to the government's case. Soon after, the judge granted a
judgment of acquittal, as it was clear that the prosecution could
not proceed. 8
The Tenth Circuit distinguished this case from Appawoo
litigated for the next ten years and goes up to the Supreme Court of the
United States and in the meantime the Government amends, you have done
your client a very great disservice, because there is no bar to him being
prosecuted .... Now, that is poor legal representation from my point of view,
and I am going to do what I can to protect him against his counsel, and we
will just keep that right where it is and get a jury for you one of these days,
and when we get the matter up before the jury we will get far enough down
the way with the evidence to see what is involved and then we will entertain
your motion.
Id. at 1245-46.
" Id. at 1244-45.
430 U.S. 564, 571 (1977).
553 F.2d at 1246. By declaring that its finding was a ruling on the pretrial motion,
the Tenth Circuit skirted the issue as to whether the remands it ordered were retrials
within the "manifest necessity" requirement of United States v. Perez, 22 U.S. 579 (1824).
553 F.2d 1247 (10th Cir. 1977).
" Id. at 1249.
FED. R. CRIM. P. 29(b)(3) requires the motions to suppress evidence must be raised
prior to trial.
" 553 F.2d at 1248.
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because it concluded that the judgment of acquittal was based on
the sufficiency of the evidence under rule 29(a). 9 A valid jeop-
ardy was created, barring any subsequent appeal. Unlike the ear-
lier case, the Tenth Circuit's refusal to allow the appeal precluded
it from reviewing the constitutional issues in the motion to sup-
press.6 0 The court denied review despite its own conclusions that
the trial judge had "frustrated the proper trial" of the defendants
and had "aborted a proper consideration of a challenge to a large
segment of the proof."'"
In granting the appeals in Appawoo, and barring review in
Fay, the Tenth Circuit's primary consideration was whether the
judgments of acquittal were in conformity with rule 29. If the
acquittal was based on the insufficiency of evidence, as in Fay,
the court looked upon the proceeding as a bona fide jeopardy with
no appeal possible. If the acquittal was not related to the evi-
dence, the court did not feel constrained by the double jeopardy
clause because there was no bona fide acquittal.
The major difficulty in reconciling Fay with Appawoo is the
Tenth Circuit's conclusion that the judgment of acquittal in Fay
was based on the sufficiency of the evidence. It is arguable that
since' the motion to suppress evidence was not ruled -on before
trial and therefore was not reviewable, 2 the Tenth Circuit had no
way to determine what evidence the trial judge could use consti-
tutionally in judging the sufficiency of the evidence. Further-
more, since the ruling on the motion to suppress directly preceded
the acquittal, 3 and the ruling was based on constitutional issues,
it is arguable that these issues, and not the evidence presented,
were the real basis for the acquittal. Under this hypothesis the
judgment of acquittal was not based on the sufficiency of evi-
dence under rule 29 and therefore was appealable. 4
B. Voluntariness of Confession
Appellant in United States v. Shoemaker65 contested his
The Tenth Circuit relied on the trial judge's exclamations made after his ruling to
suppress the evidence. Id.
w See text accompanying notes 51-52 supra.
" 553 F.2d at 1249.
62 See text accompanying notes 59-60 supra.
See text accompanying note 58 supra.
See text accompanying notes 52-54 supra.
542 F.2d 561 (10th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1004 (1976).
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conviction of murder while attempting rape6 on two grounds:
one, that his confession was involuntary under the McNabb-
Mallory rule 7 and rule 5(a) of the Federal Rules of Criminal
Procedure; 8 and two, that the lower court erred in admitting into
evidence photographs of the victim which had limited probative
value and a highly inflammatory effect on the jury.
After being advised of his Miranda rights, defendant was
questioned for six hours before being released. He was inter-
viewed again three days later; after several hours of questioning,
the defendant gave an oral confession. He was given a new
Miranda instruction before each questioning session began." On
Saturday afternoon, the defendant dictated and signed a confes-
sion after a final advisement of rights, and was taken before the
magistrate. 0
The Tenth Circuit rejected defendant's interpretation of rule
5(a) to the effect that a defendant had to be brought before a
magistrate within a "reasonable" time, six hours after arrest
under McNabb and Mallory.7 First, the court concluded that
a 18 U.S.C. 1111 (1966).
" Mallory v. United States, 354 U.S. 449 (1957); McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S.
332 (1943). In Mallory, the Supreme Court reaffiruRed its prioropolicy set forth in McNabb,
that a defendant must be taken before a magistrate with no undue delay. The rule is
stated in no uncertain terms:
The arrested person may, of course, be "booked" by the police. But he is not
to be taken to police headquarters in order to carry out a process of inquiry
that lends itself, even if not so designed, to eliciting damaging statements
to support the arrest and ultimately his guilt.
Mallory, 354 U.S. at 454.
0 FED. R. CraM. P. 5(a) provides in part: "An officer making an arrest under a warrant
issued upon a complaint or any person making an arrest without a warrant shall take the
arrested person without unnecessary delay before the nearest available federal magistrate
* All of the questioning on Friday evening took place at defendant's place of employ-
ment, a carnival operating in a national park, where the victim had been found. 542 F.2d
at 562-63. Defendant remained in park headquarters until his confession, at which time
he was taken to the nearest federal jail. 542 F.2d at 562-63.
" Id. Some twenty-two hours elapsed between the time agents began the actual
interview on Friday evening and the time defendant actually appeared before a magistrate
on Saturday afternoon. For purposes of applying the McNabb-Mallory rule and rule 5(a),
notes 47-48 supra, the court analyzes a 13-hour delay: Arrest took place shortly after
defendant's oral confession around midnight and a written confession was signed some-
time after 1 p.m. the following day.
"1 The origin of defendant's "six hour" rule is unclear. In Mallory, the delay between
arrest and arraignment was at least seven hours. 354 U.S. at 450-51. The delay in McNabb
was two or three days. 318 U.S. at 334-38. And delays of between 12 and 24 hours have
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until the defendant confessed, "he was never restrained physi-
cally nor told that he was under arrest or otherwise not free to
leave. Moreover, the evidence tended to show that [the] ques-
tioning sessions ... singularly lacked acts of oppression or coer-
cion .... 7
Second, the court ruled that noncompliance with the six-
hour rule did not ipso facto render the confession inadmissible.73
Rather, the time between arrest and arraignment was only one of
several factors to be considered by the trial judge in determining
admissibility, and it was not necessarily conclusive.7" Additional
factors weighed included the fact that some of the delay was
attributable to the defendant who had refused to go before the
magistrate without first seeing members of his family; the week-
end day involved; the time of day of the arrest; the distance
traveled; and the numerous Miranda warnings.75 On balance, the
court concluded, a thirteen-hour delay did not render the confes-
sion inadmissible.
76
The court quickly dismissed the defendant's second conten-
tion, that the photographs of the victim were inadmissible. The
court ruled that the admission of photographs is a function of the
trial judge's discretiofi, and it found no abuse of that discretion.
been upheld. See, e.g., United States v. Collins, 462 F.2d 792 (2nd Cir. 1972), cert. denied,
409 U.S. 988 (1972) (delay of 21 hours); Evans v. United States, 325 F.2d 596 (8th Cir.
1963), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 968 (1964) (12-hour delay). See also FED. R. CiuM. P. 5(a),
note 68 supra.
" 542 F.2d at 563.
13 Id. (citing United States v. Crocker, 510 F.2d 1129 (10th Cir. 1975); United States
v. Davis, 456 F.2d 1192 (10th Cir. 1972)). In Crocker, the Tenth Circuit ruled that the
statutory guidelines for determining voluntariness set forth in 18 U.S.C. 3501(a) (1969)
had been correctly applied. 510 F.2d at 1138. The guidelines specify that the trial judge
shall take into consideration all the circumstances surrounding the giving of the confes-
sion, including the time between arrest and arraignment, defendant's knowledge of the
crime with which he is charged or of which he is suspected, and whether defendant knew
of his rights. 18 U.S.C. § 3501(b).
, 542 F.2d at 563. See note 73 supra.
" 542 F.2d at 563.
I d. The result reached is not inconclusive with Mallory:
The duty enjoined upon arresting officers to arraign "without unneces-
sary delay" indicates that the command does not call for mechanical or
automatic obedience. Circumstances may justify a brief delay between arrest
and arraignment, as for instance, where the story volunteered by the accused
is susceptible to quick verification through third parties. But the delay must
not be of a nature to give opportunity for the exaction of a confession.




A. Right to Counsel
In two recent cases, the Tenth Circuit denied claims of inef-
fective assistance of counsel in violation of the sixth Amendment.
In Gillihan v. Rodriguez,77 the defendant, convicted on four
counts of first-degree murder, attacked the adequacy of his court-
appointed lawyers at both the trial level and on appeal from the
New Mexico trial court conviction. The Tenth Circuit adhered to
the majority position that relief on the ground of ineffective coun-
sel will only be granted where the "trial was a farce, or a mockery
of justice, or was shocking to the conscience of the reviewing court
. . . or [was] without adequate opportunity for conference and
preparation . 78
The court held that counsel's failure to seek a change of
venue despite massive publicity could not be challenged by the
defendant where he never requested a change and was unaware
of any publicity.
Rodriguez also contended that his counsel had failed to re-
quire the prosecutor to disclose the existence of exculpatory evi-
dence. The court found, however, that counsel did not become
aware of this evidence until during the trial; the evidence was,
nevertheless, immaterial where the appellant had admitted com-
mitting the act alleged but was maintaining innocence by reason
of insanity. 0
Counsel's failure to object to the prosecutor's reference to the
defendant as a "mad dog" during closing arguments was justi-
fied, in the court's view, because there was no chance of obtaining
a mistrial, the remark was consistent with a defense of insanity,
and his lawyers used the expression to the defendant's benefit
during their closing arguments."' The change of his plea from "not
551 F.2d 1182 (10th Cir. 1977).
Goforth v. United States, 314 F.2d 868 (10th Cir. 1963). See also United States v.
Coppola, 486 F.2d 882, 887 (10th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 948 (1974); Johnson v.
United States, 485 F.2d 240, 241-42 (10th Cir. 1973); Tapia v. Rodriguez, 446 F.2d 410,
416 (10th Cir. 1971); United States v. Davis, 436 F.2d 679, 681 (10th Cir. 1971).




CRIMINAL LAW AND PROCEDURE
guilty" to "not guilty by reason of insanity" was found to have
been made with the defendant's consent.
8 2
In view of the fact that the defendant had told the trial judge
he was satisfied with his lawyers, the Tenth Circuit, in line with
its prior decisions, determined that the appellant's dissatisfaction
with his counsel arose only after the imposition of sentence', and
that "[n]either hindsight nor success is the measure for deter-
mining adequacy of legal representation .... "4 The court also
agreed with the district court that " 'counsel need not appeal
every possible question of law at the risk of being found to be
ineffective.' "5 Thus, despite defense counsel's objection to the
trial court's temporary insanity instruction, he need not have
raised that issue on appeal.
In United States v. Allen,8 the defendant alleged that he had
not made his attorney aware of the seriousness of his mental
condition because he had not realized its importance at that time.
The Tenth Circuit concluded that evidence of the defendant's
mental condition was readily available to counsel before trial and
was not such "newly discovered evidence" as would warrant a
new trial.
87
Evidence of the defendant's mental illness was presented
during direct examination by his counsel. The court stressed that
a claim of lack of knowledge on the part of trial counsel, where
there was an abundance of evidence before him, could not be
transformed into an argument of ineffective assistance of counsel
on appeal. According to the Tenth Circuit, the trial counsel's
statement, that he would have tried the case on an entirely differ-
ent basis had he been aware of the existence of the defendant's
Id. at 1187.
1 Id. at 1188. See Johnson v. United States, 485 F.2d 240, 242 (10th Cir. 1973).
Tapia v. Rodriguez, 446 F.2d 410, 416 (10th Cir. 1971); See also Lorraine v. United
States, 444 F.2d 1 (10th Cir. 1971).
551 F.2d at 1189.
554 F.2d 398 (10th Cir. 1977).
554 F.2d at 403. "[N]ewly discovered evidence must be more than impeaching or
cumulative; it must be material to the issues involved; it must be such as would probably
produce an acquittal; and a new trial is not warranted by evidence which, with reasonable
diligence, could have been discovered and produced at trial." Id. See also United States
v. Leyba, 504 F.2d 441, 442-43 (10th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 934 (1975).
U 554 F.2d at 403. See United States v. DeCoster, 487 F.2d 1197, 1204-05 (D.C. Cir.
1973); United States v. Brown, 476 F.2d 933, 935 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
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mental disorder, reflected nothing more than the natural expecta-
tion of unsuccessful counsel that improvement could be made the
second time around.
Where counsel has the basic facts but simply does not pres-
ent a defense on the basis of those facts, the court will not grant
a new trial on the ground of inadequate counsel; to do so would
be to put a "premium on neglect" and encourage withholding
available information in order to present it as "newly discovered
evidence" should the verdict be adverse."
B. Jury Composition
United States v. Test 1o involved a challenge to the jury selec-
tion plan adopted by the District Court for the District of Colo-
rado based on the Jury Selection and Service Act of 196811 and
the fifth and sixth amendments to the United States Constitu-
tion. The defendants argued that Chicanos, blacks, and persons
under forty years of age were underrepresented on the master jury
wheel and that jurors drawn from that wheel were not "selected
at random from a fair cross section of the community" as required
by the Act and the Constitution." They further alleged that the
excuse, exemption, and disqualification categories adopted by
the plan violated the Act. 3
The Colorado jury selection plan utilizes voter registration
lists as provided by the Act: these lists are the primary source of
names for prospective jurors, but the Act also provides for supple-
mentation, where necessary, if great disparities exist.94
The Tenth Circuit, along with the majority of lower federal
courts, construed the statutory "fair cross section" standard as
0 554 F.2d at 405. Cf. United States v. Vowteras, 500 F.2d 1210, 1212 (2d Cir. 1974),
cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1069 (1975).
550 F.2d 577 (10th Cir. 1976).
" 28 U.S.C. §§ 1861-1874 (1968).
28 U.S.C. § 1861 provides: "It is the policy of the United States that all litigants
in Federal courts entitled to trial by jury shall have the right to grand and petit juries
selected at random from a fair cross section of the community in the district or division
wherein the court convenes . ... "
1" Under the plan, excuse, exemption, or disqualification was provided for persons
residing in the judicial district for less than one year, persons convicted or under indict-
ment for serious crimes, persons not literate in the English language, persons residing in
certain divisions of the district, women with children under 10 years of age, sole proprie-
tors, and persons without transportation. 550 F.2d at 593-95.
- 28 U.S.C. § 1863(b)(2).
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substantially equivalent to the constitutional standard, pre-
viously developed, 5 providing for "reasonable representation." In
order to show a violation of the Act, the defendants must show
that Chicanos and blacks constitute a cognizable group," that
these groups are systematically or totally excluded from the jury
selection process, 7 and, as a result, that the jury pools are not
''reasonably representative" of the community.
In Test, the defendants demonstrated only a disparity be-
tween the proportion of Chicanos and blacks in the voting-age
population and the proportion of Chicanos and blacks appearing
on the voter registration lists. No court has required supplemen-
tation of voter registration lists merely because an identifiable
group votes in a proportion lower than the rest of the population."
Nor has a challenge to a jury selection plan been successful where
based solely on statistical evidence, as here."
The Tenth Circuit relied on Swain v. Alabama'" to hold that
the jury roll need not mirror the community. 0' The court as-
sumed without proof that Chicanos and blacks constitute a cog-
03 See, e.g., United States v. Whiting, 538 F.2d 220, 222 (8th Cir. 1976); Anderson v.
Casscles, 531 F.2d 682, 685 (2d Cir. 1976); United States v. Tijerina, 446 F.2d 675, 678-81
(10th Cir. 1971). The latest Supreme Court pronouncement on this issue is Taylor v.
Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522 (1975), which is in accord with this construction.
N 550 F.2d 585. To establish cognizability, it is necessary to prove: "(1) the presence
of some quality or attribute which 'defines and limits' the group; (2) a cohesiveness of
'attitudes of ideas or experience' which distinguishes the group from the general social
milieu; and (3) a 'community of interest' which may not be represented by other segments
of society. United States v. Test, 399 F. Supp. 683, 689 (D. Colo. 1975).
17 550 F.2d at 586. There are two lines of Supreme Court cases in which allegations
of systematic exclusion have proven successful. The first is the "rule of exclusion" where
there is proof that a cognizable group has been totally excluded or has received only token
representation on juries. See, e.g., Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522 (1975); Alexander v.
Louisiana, 405 U.S. 625 (1972); Norris v. Alabama, 294 U.S. 587 (1935). The second line
of cases deals with "substantial underrepresentation" or "systematic decimation," com-
bined with obvious opportunities for discrimination. See, e.g., Turner v. Fouche, 396 U.S.
346 (1970); Carter v. Jury Comm'n, 396 U.S. 320 (1970); Whitus v. Georgia, 385 U.S. 545
(1967). Under both lines, an inference of discrimination is raised which must be rebutted
by the government with something more than general averments of good faith, which are
otherwise sufficient. See, e.g., Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, 227-28 (1965).
See, e.g., United States v. Freeman, 514 F.2d 171 (8th Cir. 1975); United States v.
Lewis, 472 F.2d 252 (3d Cir. 1973); United States v. Guzman, 468 F.2d 1245 (2d Cir. 1972),
cert. denied, 410 U.S. 937 (1973); United States v. Ross, 468 F.2d 1213 (9th Cir. 1972),
cert. denied, 410 U.S. 989 (1973).
U 550 F.2d at 587.
"0 380 U.S. 202 (1965).
" Id. at 208.
DENVER LAW JOURNAL
nizable group. In this case the defendants failed to show that
Chicanos and blacks had been totally or systematically excluded
from the selection process.
The court concluded that disparities of less than one person
in the demographic composition of petit and grand juries and a
difference of two persons on a jury panel of fifty are not substan-
tial enough to warrant judicial intervention. 2 The court further
noted that persons under forty years of age did not comprise a
"cognizable" group as required to prove unconstitutionality or a
violation of the Act. 0 3 The excuses, exemptions, and disqualifica-
tions alleged to be unconstitutional, were expressly permitted by
statute,1'0 and did not result in systematic exclusion or substan-
tial underrepresentation. 1°0
IV. TRIAL MATTERS
A. Joinder or Severance
In United States v. Walton,'06 the defendants were jointly
tried and convicted of aiding and abetting interstate transporta-
tion of forged securities in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 2 and 2314.
On appeal, the defendants alleged prejudicial error in the trial
court's denial of their motions for severance.
The Tenth Circuit acknowledged that the disposition of a
motion for severance is within the trial court's sound discretion. 07
A refusal to grant a motion for severance is error only upon abuse
of discretion such that defendant is denied a fair trial.0 8
The court rejected defendants' various allegations of preju-
dice and determined that the denial of the motions for severance
was proper. °9
102 550 F.2d at 590. In Swain, the Supreme Court approved of disparities ranging from
10-16 percent between voting-age population and names on the master jury rolls. 380 U.S.
at 205, 208-09.
'1 550 F.2d at 591.
1- 28 U.S.C. §§ 1865(b)(1), (b)(5), (b)(2), 1863(b)(3).
105 550 F.2d at 595.
'" 552 F.2d 1354 (10th Cir. 1977).
'0 United States v. Davis, 436 F.2d 679 (10th Cir. 1971); United States v. Rodgers,
419 F.2d 1315 (10th Cir. 1969). See also FED. R. Cam. P. 14.
10 United States v. Riebold, 557 F.2d 697 (10th Cir. 1977); United States v. Earley,
482 F.2d 53 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1111 (1973); United States v. Mallory, 460
F.2d 243 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 870 (1972); United States v. Rodgers, 419 F.2d
1315 (10th Cir. 1969); Baker v. United States, 329 F.2d 786 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 379
U.S. 853 (1964).
"I Most of the different bases for the motions for severance were determined to be
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B. Affirmative Defenses
In United States v. Rosenfeld, 10 the Tenth Circuit consid-
ered the affirmative defense of entrapment to a conviction of
illegal distribution of cocaine. The defendant alleged that the
persistent conduct and solicitations of a Federal Drug Adminis-
tration agent, induced him to enter into the illegal transaction.
The agent contacted the defendant seeking to arrange a co-
caine purchase. Upon defendant's refusal to do business with
him, the agent called him approximately 18 to 20 times to get him
to deal in drugs. The agent eventually induced the defendant to
deal with him when the defendant's father became hospitalized
without insurance coverage and the defendant's finances were
low.
The Tenth Circuit held that the persistent calls of the agent
did not constitute duress or entrapment."' The family troubles
which finally led the defendant to deal with the agent did not
"cause the defendant's act to be entrapement as a matter of
law.''9'
2
The elements required for a finding of entrapment are set out
in Martinez v. United States, "' cited by the court in Rosenfeld.
According to Martinez, entrapment does not become applicable
until the commission of the crime charged is admitted by the
accused," and occurs when "the criminal design or conduct origi-
nonprejudicial. On appeal, however, one of the defendants claimed that the unexpected
testimony of a co-defendant was highly prejudicial to the defendant's case. The court
didn't affirm or deny the prejudicial nature of this action, but, in veiwing the totality of
the circumstances, decided there was no abuse of the trial court's discretion. The court
stated that if there was no cooperation among the several defense counsel (as evidenced
here by the co-defendant's unexpectedly taking the stand) the defense cousel must so
inform the court. In this case, the court was not advised of any lack of cooperation and
could therefore presume cooperation between counsel. In addition, when the co-defendant
took the stand, neither of the other defendants moved for an in camera hearing to preview
the contents of the testimony, nor was a motion for severance made before or during the
co-defendant's testimony, nor was any motion to strike or motion for mistrial made after
the co-defendant's testimony. This inaction on the part of the defense counsel acted in
effect as a waiver of a subsequent attack on the prejudicial character of the co-defendant's
testimony. In support of this ruling, see Rhone v. United States, 365 F.2d 980 (D.C. Cir.
1966).
545 F.2d 98 (10th Cir. 1976).
Id. at 101.
112 Id.
11 373 F.2d 810 (10th Cir. 1967).
,14 Id. at 811.
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nates in or is the product of the minds of the government officials
and is implanted by them in the mind of an otherwise innocent
person."1" 5 When the affirmative defense of entrapment is raised,
the government has the burden of proving that entrapment did
not occur."' However, the government has this burden only where
the evidence of entrapment is undisputed. Where a question of
fact as to the existence of entrapment is present, it is unnecessary
for the government to proceed affirmatively.
The Tenth Circuit rejected the per se rule enunciated in
United States v. Bueno,17 that the government must come for-
ward to contradict the defendant when the defense of entrap-
ment is raised. Rather, where the existence of entrapment is dis-
puted, the jury is entitled to reject uncontradicted portions of the
defendant's testimony despite a total lack of countervailing evi-
dence. Rosenfeld demonstrates the lengths to which the Tenth
Circuit will go to deny that entrapment is present as a matter of
law.
Another affirmative defense was rejected by the Tenth Cir-
cuit in United States v. Evans."I The court ruled that prison
conditions, whatever they might have been, could not justify a
prison riot or any other criminal conduct." 9 This holding is in
accordance with prior Tenth Circuit decisions and with decisions
of other circuit courts.120
In United States v. Gano, "' the court confronted the issue of
the admissibility of evidence pursuant to rule 404(b) of the Fed-
eral Rules of Evidence, 22 pertaining to crimes committed by the
"1' Id. at 812. Some years later, in United States v. Gurule, 522 F.2d 20 (10th Cir.
1975), the Tenth Circuit stated that if a person is shown to be so, then there is no
entrapment. The court in Rosenfeld relies on both Martinez and Gurule.
"I United States v. Martinez, 373 F.2d at 812.
117 447 F.2d 903, 906 (5th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 873 (1973). In Bueno, the
Fifth Circuit held that entrapment is established as a matter of law when a government
informer furnishes the narcotics to the defendant for sale to a government agent.
Its 542 F.2d 805 (10th Cir. 1976).
M' Id. at 819.
120 See, e.g., Conte v. Cardwell, 475 F.2d 698, 701 (6th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 414
U.S. 873 (1973); United States v. Haley, 417 F.2d 625 (4th Cir. 1969); Nelson v. United
States, 208 F.2d 211 (10th Cir. 1953).
1'2 560 F.2d 990 (10th Cir. 1977).
12 FED. R. Evi. 404(b) provides:
Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible to prove the
character of a person in order to show that he acted in conformity therewith.
It may, however, be admissible for other purposes, such as proof of motive,
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defendant other than those charged in the indictment.
The defendant was convicted on three counts of having car-
nal knowledge of a female under the age of sixteen. The defen-
dant, a social worker, was assigned to counsel the family of a
patient. Pursuant to this assignment, he became sexually in-
volved with the girl's mother and persuaded her to use marijuana
and to put it into her daughter's food. Eventually, the defendant
gave marijuana to the girl and induced her to have sexual inter-
course with him.
The issue in the case was the admissibility of evidence con-
cerning the defendant's sexual relations with the mother and his
insistence that the family use marijuana to relax. The court con-
cluded that the evidence was both relevant, material, and indis-
pensable to a complete showing since the numerous incidents
were so closely related. 23 The evidence was also admissible to
prove motive, preparation, plan, and state of mind,2 despite the
fact that the commission of the act was undisputed in that the
defendant relied on insanity.I Thus, evidence is admissible both
to prove the offense charged and to show the complete picture of
the crime, even if the defendant has admitted the acts charged.
The Tenth Circuit held that the prejudicial effect of this evidence
was outweighed by its probative value.
C. Trial Court Discretion
In United States v. Munz, 21 the defendant was convicted of
robbing a federally insured bank and assaulting and jeopardizing
the life of a teller by the use of a weapon in violation of 18 U.S.C.
§§ 2113(a) and (d). On appeal, the defendant alleged prejudical
error arising from hypothetical questioning of an expert witness
by the trial judge.
The defendant's defense was lack of mental competency at
the time of the offense. Extensive medical records were intro-
duced into evidence by the defendant, clearly overcoming the
presumption of sanity. To attempt to establish the defendant's
opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, indentity, or absence of
mistake or accident.
123 560 F.2d at 993.
124 Id.
125 Id.
1- 542 F.2d 1382 (10th Cir. 1976).
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competency, the prosecution presented testimony of an expert
witness. During the direct examination of this witness, the trial
judge questioned the witness regarding a hypothetical situation
which, although similar to that of defendant's, raised facts not
present in the case.
The trial judge instructed the jury that his questioning re-
lated only to a hypothetical situation and should be disregarded
in considering the defendant's case. The Tenth Circuit held these
curative instructions to be sufficient to eliminate any prejudice
resulting from the trial judge's participation.'2
United States v. Pinkey28 examined the proper participation
of a trial judge in the conduct of a trial.
Defendant was convicted of using the United States mails to
perpetrate a scheme to defraud and obtain money, in violation of
18 U.S.C.A. § 1341. While incarcerated in Colorado State Peni-
tentiary, defendant wrote letters to recent widows, feigning a past
friendship with their deceased husbands and asking that portions
of cash loans made by the defendant to their husbands be repaid
as soon as possible.
Defendant elected to proceed pro se at trial.'2 During the
court's voir dire examination, the defendant, in the juror's pres-
ence, wrote suggested questions on a piece of paper and submit-
ted them to the judge.
The trial judge, out of the presence of the jury, alerted the
prosecutor to the existence of the handwritten voir dire questions
and suggested that the prosecutor might wish to have his hand-
writing expert make a comparison of this sample of the defen-
dant's writing. 130 On redirect examination, the expert witness
I" The defendant argued that the prejudice could not be cured by a subsequent
instruction, citing United States v. Nazzaro, 472 F.2d 302 (2d Cir. 1973), and Horton v.
United States, 317 F.2d 595 (D.C. Cir. 1963). These two cases are examplee of judges'
conduct and comments deemed so prejudicial as to not be cured by jury instructions.
However, the court felt that the prompt curative instructions given here did overcome any
prejudice. See United States v. De Angelis, 490 F.2d 1004 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 416 U.S.
956 (1974).
1- 548 F.2d 305 (10th Cir. 1977).
In The court determined that the defendant had intelligently and voluntarily waived
his sixth amendment right to counsel with full understanding of the risks involved. Id. at
311.
1 In its case-in-chief the prosecution had introduced evidence through a handwriting
expert's analysis linking the defendant to the above-mentioned letters already in evidence.
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identified the writing as the defendant's and the judge admitted
it into evidence.
On appeal the Tenth Circuit rejected defendant's contention
that the judge's suggestion constituted plain error because it de-
nied defendant a fair trial and compelled the defendant to testify
in his own defense. The court held that the trial judge not only
has the prerogative but an obligation to inject into the trial mat-
ters which are important to the search for truth; a judge's partici-
pation in trials is proper so long as he remains impartial and does
not prejudice any party.' 3' The court concluded that the trial
judge's suggestion was within his discretion and that the defen-




1. Suppression of Evidence
In United States v. Picone, 3 the Tenth Circuit had its first
occasion to apply United States v. Donovan, 13, a Supreme Court
case on suppression of wiretap evidence when some defendants
were not named in the wiretap order.' As a result of information
obtained through two judicially authorized wiretaps, defendants
Picone and Simone had been charged with operating a racketeer-
ing enterprise. 13 The evidence as to Simone was suppressed be-
cause he had not been named in the initial wiretap order.'37 The
,", United States v. Wheeler, 444 F.2d 385 (10th Cir. 1971); McBride v. United States,
409 F.2d 1046 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 938 (1969); Massey v. United States, 358
F.2d 782 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 878 (1966); Ayash v. United States, 352 F.2d
1009 (10th Cir. 1965); Gardner v. United States, 283 F.2d 580 (10th Cir. 1960).
112 In addition, the court noted that even if it had found prejudice due to the trial
judge's participation, in light of the overwhelming evidence of the defendant's guilt, it
would have been harmless. 548 F.2d at 310.
"' 560 F.2d 998 (10th Cir. 1977).
'u 429 U.S. 413 (1977).
'' The Supreme Court ruled that failure to name a particular defendant in the
application for a wiretap order was not fatal absent a showing that "the presence of that
information as to additional targets would have precluded judicial authorization of the
intercept." Id. at 436.
,3, 18 U.S.C. § 1952 (1970).
,3 The first wiretap order was obtained on October 5, 1973, and it authorized inter-
ception of wire communications at defendant Picone's place of business and at the resi-
dences of two defendants. Five persons were named, but defendants Simone and Goodfel-
low were not named. The second wiretap order, obtained in November 1973, authorized
the same interception of wire communications; this order included Simone but not Good-
fellow. 560 F.2d at 1000.
1978
DENVER LAW JOURNAL
evidence against Picone was also suppressed because it was
tainted by conversations with a third defendant, Goodfellow, who
had not been named in either order. 138 The Government appealed
from both suppression orders, but the Tenth Circuit withheld
disposition until Donovan was decided by the Supreme Court.
13
1
In Donovan, the Supreme Court ruled that under the wiretap
statute:' 0 (1) The Government must name all individuals whose
conversations it has probable cause to believe will be inter-
cepted;' and (2) the failure to identify certain people whose
conversations are overheard does not warrant suppression so long
as the additional information, i.e., the omitted names, would not
have precluded judicial authorization. 4
2
In Picone, the Tenth Circuit first ruled that the failure to
name Simone in the initial wiretap order did not warrant sup-
pression of the evidence. The court recited the statutory pre-
requisites for a lawful intercept order: probable cause to believe
that (1) an individual is engaged in criminal activity; (2) particu-
lar communications concerning that offense will be obtained
through the interception; (3) normal investigative techniques
have failed or appear unlikely to succeed; and (4) the target facili-
ties are being used in furtherance of the specified criminal activ-
ity."3 Citing Donovan, the court ruled that suppression is not the
required remedy for every failure to comply with statutory re-
quirements:
To the contrary, suppression is required only for a "failure to
satisfy any of those statutory requirements that directly and sub-
stantially implement the congressional intention to limit the use of
intercept procedures to those situations clearly calling for the em-
ployment of this extraordinary investigative device." '
The failure to name Simone did not warrant suppression because
the presence of Simone's name or other information about him
would not have precluded the court's authorization'of the wire-
I3 Id.
In United States v. Picone, 560 F.2d at 999 n.2.
110 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-2520 (1970).
"' 429 U.S. at 428.
142 Id. at 436.
"1 560 F.2d at 1001 (citing 18 U.S.C. § 2518(3) (1970)).
1" 560 F.2d at 1001 (quoting United States v. Donovan, 429 U.S. at 433). See also
United States v. Giordano, 416 U.S. 505, 527 (1974).
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tap."' Moreover, no facts subsequently revealed would have
caused the judge to deny the order.' Thus, the suppression order
as to Simone was reversed.
In the second part of its opinion, the court addressed Picone's
argument that the Government deliberately withheld defendant
Goodfellow's name"17 from both intercept applications, thus taint-
ing any conversations between himself and the unnamed Goodfel-
low.' The court rejected defendant's claim that the Govern-
ment's failure to include Goodfellow was an improper attempt to
withhold pertinent information from the lower court which au-
thorized the intercept. Rather, the court ruled that two factors,
the Government's representation that Goodfellow's name was
withheld to protect confidential informants and the defendant's
ample opportunity to raise this issue and question Government
witnesses about any improprieties, demonstrated that the defen-
dant's claim was without merit." ' Conclusory allegations of
wrongdoing without proof did not constitute a sufficient basis for
suppression."0 Therefore, the suppression order in favor of Picone
was also reversed.
The Tenth Circuit rejected numerous grounds for appeal in
affirming defendant's conviction in United States v. Moore."'
Defendant was convicted of attempting to destroy the United
10 The court takes special note of the ample information provided by the F.B.I.
affidavit to the judge prior to judicial authorization. The court also notes that the affidavit
contained a substantial amount of information concerning Simone's involvement, even
though he was not specifically named. 560 F.2d at 1001-1002.
'" The court studied a supplemental F.B.I. affidavit, and found it persuasive in
concluding that all of the available information concerning Simone's involvement would
not have caused the authorizing judge to deny the intercept order. Id. at 1002 n.5.
I," See note 5 supra.
"0 Defendant Picone argued that the Government's intentional failure to comply with
the naming requirement of the wiretap statute made this case distinguishable from
Donovan, 560 F.2d at 1002. Picone rested his argument on a footnote to the Donovan
opinion:
There is no suggestion in this case that the Government agents know-
ingly failed to identify respondents . . . for the purpose of keeping relevant
information from the District Court that might have prompted the court to
conclude that probable cause was lacking. If such a showing had been made,
we would have a different case.
United States v. Donovan, 429 U.S. at 436 n.23.
110 560 F.2d at 1002.
"' Id. See also United States v. De La Fuente, 548 F.2d 528, 533-34 (5th Cir.), cert.
denied, 431 U.S. 932 (1977); Wilson v. United States, 218 F.2d 754, 757 (10th Cir. 1955).
"' 556 F.2d 479 (10th Cir. 1977).
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States Federal Courthouse Building in Oklahoma City by means
of a bomb device. 152 Among her grounds for appeal, 5 3 defendant
contended that the evidence was insufficient to sustain a convic-
tion, and that evidence which showed that a bomb similar to the
one found in the courthouse had been discovered at the defen-
dant's former residence should have been excluded." 4
The Tenth Circuit ruled that, although no one saw the defen-
dant enter the building, the facts and circumstances 5 5 permitted
152 18 U.S.C. § 844(f) (1976).
' Defendant urged six grounds for appeal:
(1) The evidence was insufficient to sustain conviction. See text accompanying notes 5-
8 infra.
(2) The indictment was nonspecific and unconstitutionally vague, or alternatively, de-
fendant's request for a bill of particulars should have been granted. The court held that
because the language of the indictment tracked the language of the statute, the indict-
ment was sufficiently definite to apprise the defendant of the crime charged. United
States v. Moore, 556 F.2d at 482-83. As to defendant's request for a bill of particulars,
the denial of her request was within the sound discretion of the trial court and would not
be disturbed on appeal. Id. at 483.
(3) The trial court erred in refusing to suppress evidence of a former conviction in
California. Defendant's prior conviction had been expunged under a California statute,
CAL. PErAL CoD 1203.4 (West 1977), but the court ruled that the evidence was still
admissible for impeachment purposes. Citing United States v. Potts, 528 F.2d 883 (9th
Cir. 1975), and Barbosa v. Wilson, 385 F.2d 319 (9th Cir. 1967), the court concluded that
the evidence was admissible in a subsequent federal proceeding, the California expunge-
ment notwithstanding. United States v. Moore, 556 F.2d at 483-84.
(4) The trial court erred in not granting a mistrial when evidence of defendant's associa-
tion with the Symbionese Liberation Army was inadvertently presented to the jury. The
court noted that the evidence was given voluntarily through no fault of the Government
and that the jury had been instructed to disregard the evidence. Under such circum-
stances, the brief reference did not taint the entire trial and it did not require reversal.
United States v. Moore, 556 F.2d at 484-85.
(5) The trial court should have prohibited evidence of defendant's fingerprints found on
a paper sack near the bomb and evidence of similar explosives found in defendant's former
residence. See text accompanying notes 9-15 infra.
(6) The prosecuting attorney should have given defense counsel copies of all statements
given by a Government witness to the F.B.I. prior to trial; the prosecution did not give
defendant the requested copies until shortly before the witness testified. The court found
no error because the defense counsel had the opportunity to study all the statements over
an evening recess before proceeding with cross-examination. United States v. Moore, 556
F.2d at 485.
I" Defendant had lived in a house owned by her mother and cared for by a great aunt.
After defenant moved out, the new tenant discovered what appeared to be a homemade
bomb and called police. The evidence at trial included testimony by a bomb expert about
the similarity of this bomb and the courthouse bomb. Id. at 481.
I" In addition to the bomb expert's testimony, see note 154 supra, the Government
presented four other witnesses: a fingerprint expert testified that prints taken from the
courthouse bomb matched those from the bomb taken from defendant's residence; a
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the inference that defendant had planted the bomb there. 5" In
the court's view, the inference was analogous to the well-
established rule that a defendant's unexplained possession of re-
cently stolen goods is sufficient to support the inference that the
possessor is the thief.'57 The court concluded that the trial court
did not err in refusing to direct a verdict of acquittal. 5 '
Defendant also contended that United States v. Burkhart'59
prohibited the introduction of two specific pieces of government
evidence: defendant's fingerprints on a paper sack in which, it
could be inferred, the bomb was carried into the courthouse; 60
and evidence of a similar bomb and other explosive materials
found at the defendant's former residence.' The court rejected
the argument, ruling that Burkhart was distinguishable. In
Burkhart, the Tenth Circuit had ruled that evidence of prior
crimes was inadmissible absent a showing of continuity of the
offenses or a connecting link between the case on trial and prior
similar offenses. "'
In Moore, however, the admissibility of the evidence of explo-
sive materials in defendant's home was governed by rule 404(b)
which provides that evidence of prior acts is "admissible . . . as
proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowl-
chemical company employee testified concerning purchases of explosive materials by
defendant; defendant's former co-worker testified about defendant's claimed ability to
make bombs and her desire to bomb the federal building; and a policeman testified about
the observance of explosive materials and devices in defendant's home on a prior occasion.
Id. at 481-82.
"' Id. at 482.
157 Hall v. United States, 404 F.2d 1367 (10th Cir. 1968); Jenkins v. United States,
361 F.2d 615 (10th Cir. 1966).
" 556 F.2d at 482.
15' 458 F.2d 201 (10th Cir. 1972) (admission of prior convictions to prove intent held
reversible error absent continuity between the prior offense and the offense on trial).
"' The paper sack and a matchbook had been found on the ground near the bomb.
The sack contained one burned match, thus leaving the impression that the bomb had
been lighted while still in the sack. 556 F.2d at 481.
18 See note 154 supra.
The language of the court is instructive:
Continuity of the offenses or a connecting link between the case on trial
and the tendered similar offenses is always essential and is to be considered
regardless of whether the evidence is offered to prove a plan, scheme, design,
motive, knowledge or intent .... The lack of showing of a common plan,
scheme, design or intent is of itself a fatal deficiency here.
458 F.2d at 208 (emphasis added).
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edge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident."'' 3 The trial
court did not err in admitting the evidence because it bore di-
rectly on whether the defendant had planted the courthouse
bomb.'"
2. Exceptions to the Hearsay Rule
In United States v. Wiley 5" the Tenth Circuit considered
application of the conspiracy exception to the hearsay rule.", The
conspiracy exception was invoked during a jury trial in which the
defendant was convicted of distributing heroin and cocaine. The
narcotics transaction was completed at Denver's Stapleton Inter-
national Airport; the defendant's accomplice, Solomon, delivered
narcotics to an undercover government agent, handing them
under a restroom stall partition.
At trial the undercover agent testified that he could see Solo-
mon's face over the top of the partition and that Solomon nodded
his head, indicating without words that he was carrying the nar-
cotics with him in readiness for the exchange." 7 The defendant
objected to this testimony, arguing that the undercover agent was
restating the out-of-court assertion of another (Solomon's nod of
affirmation) to prove the truth of the matter asserted therein
(that indeed Solomon was delivering narcotics).
In reiterating the traditional rule, the court found that the
agent's testimony as to Solomon's nod of the head was hearsay
because the nod was intended to be assertive or communicative.
But, the court ruled that the conspiracy exception to the hearsay
rule was triggered under the facts of Wiley, permitting admission
of the undercover agent's testimony.'" However, in so ruling, the
Tenth Circuit muddled the foundational requirements of the con-
spiracy exception; and, under the Federal Rules of Evidence, the
' FED. R. EVID. 404(b).
' 556 F.2d at 485.
"' No. 77-1073 (10th Cir., June 27, 1977) (Not for Routine Publication).
'" "The hearsay rule prohibits use of a person's assertion, as equivalent
to testimony of the fact asserted, unless the assertor is brought to testify in
court on the stand, where he may be probed and cross-examined as to the
grounds of his assertion and his qualifications to make it. Grand Forks
B. & D. Co. v. Iowa Hardware Mut. Ins. Co., 75 N.D. 618, 31 N.W. 2d 495
(1948). See 5 Wigmore on Evidence (3d ed.) §§ 1361, 1364."
Leake v. Hagert, 175 N.W.2d 675 (1970).
'7 No. 77-1073 at 4.
U Id. at 6.
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court probably erred in labeling the testimony hearsay in the first
place.
Federal Rule of Evidence 801 provides: "A statement is not
hearsay if. . . [t]he statement is offered against a party and is
* . . a statement by a co-conspirator of a party during the course
and in furtherance of the conspiracy."' 69 The requirements of this
rule were met by the facts of Wiley: a statement by an unnamed
co-conspirator made during the conspiracy was offered against
the defendant. Therefore, under the rule, there was no hearsay to
begin with. The need for an exception to the hearsay rule was
obviated.
As to the foundational requirements of the conspiracy excep-
tion, the court properly noted that no conspiracy need have been
charged in order to trigger the conspiracy hearsay exception. 170
The difficulty comes in determining how much independent evi-
dence of conspiracy the Tenth Circuit required in this case. The
court did not specify any quantum; it merely quoted an Eighth
Circuit case to the effect that a "likelihood of illicit association"
constitutes enough of a conspiracy to validate the hearsay excep-
tion. '7 Thereafter, the court stated in conclusive fashion, without
supporting details, that "there is sufficient evidence of concerted





In future appellate proceedings, it may be deceivingly easy
to find a likelihood of illicit association that, under Wiley, will let
in untrustworthy and damaging hearsay.
In United States v. Plum 7 3 the Tenth Circuit considered the
business records exception 7 to the hearsay rule. The court ruled
"' The general heading of FED. R. EVID. 801(d) is "Statements which are not hear-
say. "
70 The court reasoned that "the acts and declarations of one co-defendant are admis-
sible against the other if the existence of a conspiracy is in fact shown by independent
evidence .... Id. at 6. This is consistent with previous decisions. United States v. Jones,
540 F.2d 465 (10th Cir. 1976); United States v. Lemon, 497 F.2d 854 (10th Cir. 1974);
Lowther v. United States, 455 F.2d 657 (10th Cir. 1973). There is considerable support in
other jurisdictions. United States v. Pasha, 332 F.2d 193 (7th Cir. 1964); Cossack v. United
States, 82 F.2d 214 (9th Cir. 1936).
'T, United States v. Sanders, 463 F.2d 1086 (8th Cir. 1972).
'7' No. 77-1073 at 7.
'T' No. 75-1834 (10th Cir., July 11, 1977).
'" The traditional rule is succinctly stated in Johnson v. Lutz, 253 N.Y. 124, 170 N.E.
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inadmissible a loss-claim document filled out by the intended
buyer of a shipment of silver bars that had been stolen. The loss-
claim document had been offered at trial to show that the value
of the silver shipment was in excess of the $5,000 minimum for
conviction of the defendant under 18 U.S.C. § 2315.
The Tenth Circuit decided that the loss-claim document had
not been completed in the regular course of the buyer's business
and therefore lacked indicia of trustworthiness as a business re-
cord exception under Federal Rule of Evidence 803(6).171 Never-
theless, the court ruled that admission of the document was
harmless error because a second document, a purchase order,
clearly established the value of the silver shipment at greater
than $5,000. The purchase order properly fell within the hearsay
exception, having been maintained in the regular course of busi-
ness. 1
76
In Plum the Tenth Circuit also emphasized the general ad-
missibility, as substantive evidence, of prior recorded testimony
taken at a preliminary hearing. Under traditional analysis, such
prior testimony was inadmissible hearsay if introduced to prove
the truth of the matters asserted therein. 177 The trial court in
Plum reflected this traditional approach by apparently limiting
the use of the preliminary hearing testimony for impeachment
purposes only (not hearsay).
78
In commenting on the trial court ruling, the Tenth Circuit
noted that the Federal Rules of Evidence have enlarged on prior
517 (1930); the modern counterpart is FF. R. Evm. 803(6), "Records of regularly con-
ducted activity," which provides:
(6) Records of regularly conducted activity. A memorandum, report,
record, or data compilation, in any form, of acts, events, conditions, opinions
or diagnoses, made at or near the time by, or from information transmitted
by, a person with knowledge, if kept in the course of a regularly conducted
business activity, and if it was the regular practice of that business activity
to make the memorandum, report, record, or data compilation ....
17 Id.
Id. at 11.
Such hearsay might be admissible if it was "testimony of a witness given at a
former trial of the same case on substantially the same issues, and where there was
opportunity for cross-examination" and the witness was now unavailable (dead, insane,
physically unable to testify, beyond the jurisdiction of the court, or whereabouts unknown
despite diligent search). Lone Star Gas Co. v. State, 137 Tex. 279, 153 S.W.2d 681, 697
(1941).
'T No. 75-1834 at 14.
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recorded testimony. Rule 801(d)(1) defines it as not hearsay at
all, in contrast to the traditional rule. It is substantive evidence,
admissible for all otherwise acceptable purposes. 7 ' Nevertheless,
the court said that limiting the use of prior recorded testimony
in Plum was not reversible error, for its only obvious value in the
trial was for impeachment. And it clearly had been admitted for
that purpose.0
3. Evidence of Prior Convictions
In United States v. Nolan,'"' the Tenth Circuit upheld the
admissibility at trial of a prior foreign conviction as evidence of
"intent, design, a continuing course of conduct, guilty knowledge,
mental disposition, capacity, habit, plan, motive and identity"' 8
in relation to the present charge of importing marijuana from
India. The defendant previously had been convicted in Britain of
importing hashish from India in a similar fashion.
The court sidestepped the defendant's primary contention
that the British conviction was inadmissible because there was no
evidence that the British authorities had met or exceeded Ameri-
can constitutional standards for protection of personal rights. The
British conviction wasn't introduced to "support guilt or enhance
punishment," the court noted; '8 it was introduced, not as a con-
viction per se, but as evidence tending to show activity that was
relevant to the likelihood that the defendant imported marijuana
from India in the present case.
V. JURY INSTRUCTIONS
In United States v. Walker'" the Tenth Circuit held that the
trial court erred in refusing to provide additional instructions
, FED. R. EVID. 801(d) provides, in part:
(d) Statements which are not hearsay. A statement is not hearsay
if -
(1) Prior statement by witness. The declarant testifies at the trial or
hearing and is subject to cross-examination concerning the statement, and
the statement is (A) inconsistent with his testimony, and was given under
oath subject to the penalty of perjury at a trial, hearing, or other proceeding,
or in a deposition ....
,' No. 75-1834 at 15.
,' No. 76-1177 (10th Cir., March 22, 1977).
,S2 Id. at 4-5.
I5 d.
,L 557 F.2d 741 (10th Cir. 1977).
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requested by a jury during its deliberations.' Jury confusion had
resulted because an indictment was worded in the conjunctive
while one of the two statutes the defendant was accused of violat-
ing was worded in the conjunctive and the other in the disjunc-
tive.'5 ' Compounding the confusion was the fact that the jury was
forced to rely upon memory for the judge's instruction.
The jury sent a note to the judge expressing bewilderment
over the conjunctive/disjunctive situation. The Tenth Circuit,
relying upon Rogers v. United States,5 7 found the failure of the
trial court to respond to the jury question in open court in the
presence of opposing counsel to constitute sufficient "possible
prejudice to the defendant 18 to require reversal of conviction.
In United States v. Corrigan,'89 the Tenth Circuit considered
the issue of the sufficiency of the trial court instruction concern-
ing the burden of proof relating to the affirmative defense of self-
defense. The court was largely persuaded by two cases from the
Ninth Circuit' 0 in holding that the trial court instructions were
not sufficiently clear to avoid confusion among instructions con-
cerning self-defense and other affirmative defenses and the bur-
den of proof related thereto.''
I" In addition, the Tenth Circuit held that the trial court was correct in ordering a
new trial because of harrassment of a witness.
"' Walker had been indicted for "knowingly obtaining and exercising control over the
personal property of another" (emphasis added), in violation of (1) the Assimilative
Crimes Act, 18 U.S.C. § § 7,13 (with this cause dependent upon the Colorado theft statute,
•CoLo. REv. STAT. § 18-4-401 (1973)) and (2) the federal theft statute, 18 U.S.C. § 661.
557 F.2d at 742. The Colorado statute is worded in the disjunctive as "knowingly obtaining
or exercising control over" the property of another (emphasis added), while the federal
theft statute uses the conjunctive but different language of "takes and carries away with
intent to purloin." During deliberations, only a copy of the indictment was available to
the jurors.
1"7 422 U.S. 35, 39 (1975).
U 557 F.2d at 741, 745.
'u 548 F.2d 879 (10th Cir. 1977).
Two special agents of the I.R.S. attempted to arrest the defendant at a meeting of
the Wyoming Patriots. The defendant pulled a spray canister from his pocket and sprayed
the contents - liquid red pepper - into the faces of the agents.
I" The two Ninth Circuit cases were DeGroot v. United States, 78 F.2d 244 (9th Cir.
1935), and Notaro v. United States, 363 F.2d 169 (9th Cir. 1966). 548 F.2d at 882.
"' The court stated that the instruction should make clear that "[U]nless the gov-
ernment has established beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant did not act in self-
defense, the jury should find him not guilty." 548 F.2d at 883.
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VI. POST-TRIAL PROCEEDINGS
A. Sentencing and Plea Bargaining
United States v. Fairfax"' involved an appeal pursuant to
rule 35 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure"3 alleging the
imposition of an illegal sentence. The pro se appeal of Fairfax
claimed that he had changed his plea from not guilty to guilty of
the charge of rape upon the representation by his attorney that
his sentence would be less than the thirty-year sentence imposed
by the trial court. The Tenth Circuit rejected the Rule 35 claim
as a "conclusory assertion.""' The court said that Fairfax might
still collaterally attack the trial court sentence if the standards
of specificity of allegation and other criteria enunciated in
Blackledge v. Allison"" could be met.
The issue in United States v. Davis"' was whether guilty
pleas should be vacated where the trial judge erroneously told the
defendant he could be sentenced to a total of fifty years, and the
actual sentence imposed by the court was forty-five years. Rely-
ing upon the prior Tenth Circuit case of Murray v. United
States,"'7 and finding persuasive the Fifth Circuit reasoning in
United States v. Blair, "8 the court held that the misstatement of
the maximum possible term did not entitle the defendant to relief
where there was no claim that the misinformation had had any
effect on the guilty pleas. The court did, however, remand the
case for resentencing.
B. Prisoner's/Parolee's Rights
James v. Rodrigues"' involved the validity of a proceeding
'" No. 77-1055 (10th Cir. July 28, 1977) (Not for Routine Publication).
10 FED. R. CraM. P. 35 provides in part: "The court may correct an illegal sentence
at any time and may correct a sentence imposed in an illegal manner within the time
provided herein for the reduction of sentence."
'" No. 77-1055 at 3, 4.
Is 431 U.S. 63 (1977). The Supreme Court in Blackledge allowed collateral attack on
the judgment of a state court through the filing of a writ of habeas corpus. The petition
brought in Blackledge (1) presented specific factual allegations and (2) alleged that defen-
dant's guilty plea was induced by an unkept promise. The Tenth Circuit noted that in
the instant case, the misrepresentation of Fairfax's lawyer might not qualify as an "unkept
promise" to fall within the Blackledge criterion. No. 77-1055 at 4.
544 F.2d 1056 (10th Cir. 1976).
II 419 F.2d 1076 (10th Cir. 1969) (court's misstatement of the possible maximum
sentence held not error).
n 470 F.2d 331 (5th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 908 (1973).
1" 533 F.2d 59 (10th Cir. 1977).
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initiated by a New Mexico district attorney under the New Mex-
ico Habitual Offender Act, NMSA 40A-29-5 and 40A-29-6, subse-
quent to the appellant's retrial and reconviction. Both the trial
and appellate proceedings had resulted in sentences of one to five
years. However, subsequent to the appeal and contrary to his
action following the original proceeding, the district attorney filed
an habitual criminal charge which culminated in the sentencing
of appellant to life in prison.
Relying upon Supreme Court rulings in North Carolina v.
Pearce200 and Blackledge v. Perry,2 01 the court held the filing of the
habitual criminal charge to be "manipulative" and "tactical,"
constituting an interference with the right to appeal in violation
of the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment. The court
reasoned that an appellant with a one to five year sentence should
not have to anticipate a possible sentence of life in prison. Justice
McWilliams dissented upon the ground that the habitual crimi-
nal statute is mandatory in its terms.
C. Appeals by the Government
United States v. Barney 2 2 involved a situation where the
trial court had ordered the Government upon three working days'
notice to be ready to proceed to trial on twenty-three cases under
pain of dismissal if the Government was not ready to proceed.
When the Government asked for a continuance on some of the
cases, the trial court proceeded to dismiss certain of the cases.
The Tenth Circuit found the trial court conduct to be an abuse
of discretion and "utterly unreasonable, ' ' 203 and held that "the
Government, as well as the defendant, is entitled to notice and a
reasonable time within which to get its witnesses to the court-
house.' '204
VII. STATUTORY INTERPRETATION
21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) prohibits physicians from "distribut-
ing" and "dispensing" controlled substances except when acting
no 395 U.S. 711 (1969).
' 417 U.S. 21 (1974).
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in the usual course of professional practice. United States v.
Fellman °5 held that an indictment under section 841(a)(1),
charging the defendant with "distributing" rather than "dis-
pensing" such substances to undercover agents posing as pa-
tients, was not fatally defective. In so holding, the Tenth Circuit
rejected the contrary position of the Fifth Circuit on the identical
issue,211 choosing instead to align itself with the reasoning of the
First, Sixth, and Ninth Circuits. °7
B. 18 U.S. C. § 2114
18 U.S.C. § 2114 provides in part:
Whoever assaults any person having lawful charge, control or
custody of any mail matter or of any money or other property of the
United States, with intent to rob, steal or purloin . . .or rob any
such person of mail matter, or of any money, or other property of
the United States, shall ...be imprisoned ....
The question presented in United States v. Smith0 was whether
an "assault with intent to rob" is adequately charged for purposes
of section 2114 by an indictment alleging an "attempt to rob."
The Tenth Circuit found the reasoning of the Fifth Circuit on this
identical issue to be persuasive, 09 concluding that the indictment
must fail since "statutes are to be construed so that each word is
given effect."21
C. 18 U.S.C. § 1503
18 U.S.C. § 1503 punishes by fine or imprisonment whoever
"endeavors to influence, intimidate or impede any witness, in any
court of the United States," or whoever injures any "witness in
his person or property on account of his testifying or having testi-
fied to any matter therein." United States v. White21 1 involved
the issue of who is a "witness" for purposes of establishing an
549 F.2d 181 (10th Cir. 1977).
See United States v. Leigh, 487 F.2d 206 (5th Cir. 1973).
20? Under similar fact situations, the First, Sixth, and Ninth Circuits have held
that a physician may be properly charged with unlawful "distribution" of controlled
substances. See United States v. Badia, 490 F.2d 296 (1st Cir. 1973); United States v.
Ellzey, 527 F.2d 1306 (6th Cir. 1976); United States v. Rosenberg, 515 F.2d 190 (9th Cir.
1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1031 (1976).
553 F.2d 1239 (10th Cir. 1977).
2" See Aderhold v. Schlitz, 73 F.2d 381 (5th Cir. 1934).
' 553 F.2d at 1239-42.
211 557 F.2d 233 (10th Cir. 1977).
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intent to obstruct justice within the purview of section 1503.
White, who had already pleaded guilty to charges of counterfeit-
ing, approached the car driven by Disney while Disney, a witness
for the counterfeiting case, was inside the car. White proceeded
to kick the door and yell profanities at Disney.
White argued at trial that since he had pleaded guilty prior
to the assault of Disney, he knew that there would be no trial at
the time of the assault, so that there was no prospect that Disney
would ever be called as a "witness." White thus reasoned that he
could not possess the requisite specific intent to intimidate or
injure a "witness" in his person or property for purposes of section
1503. The Tenth Circuit rejected White's argument, reasoning
that so long as a federal proceeding was pending, there existed a
real chance that Disney would be called to testify.
Bruce A. Lampert
David W. Miller
Mark R. Muller
Jack R. Olsen
John S. Upton
Karin I. Wyman
Karen S. Westrell
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